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AT common law, the wife was devoid of the power to contract.
This total disability existed for the reason that in law she
was treated as having no legal identity. Texas has never adopted
this harsh and unreasonable rule of the common law, but has, to
a large extent, regulated the wife's power to contract by statute.
There is no statute at the present time which confers upon her
the unlimited right to contract. She can bind herself by contract
only when authorized by constitution or statute, expressly or by
necessary implication.' She may make other contracts also; these,
although not authorized, are not void but voidable.2 Of course
her attempted contracts may be void, but not ordinarily unless it
would also be void if done by the husband. The following discus-
sion will deal only with those types of contracts which a married
woman may validly make, and to which a plea of coverture is
no defense.
THE WIFE'S CONTRACTS FOR NECESSARIES
Texas in 1840, passed the first marital rights statute; it pro-
vided that a wife might contract debts for necessaries during the
marriage. The statute of 1848 contained a similar provision.
The 1913 statute provided that the wife could contract for neces-
saries furnished herself and children. The present statutes (1925
revision) state three times in backhanded language that she may
validly contract for necessaries.8 For example, Article 46214 says
that the community property shall not be liable for the wife's
contracts except for necessaries furnished herself and children.
It is, therefore, established that the wife has always had express
authority to contract for necessaries in Texas. If she does bind
123 Tnx. Jun. 199 (1932).
2 Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 84 S. W. (2d) 93 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935);
Harwell v. Kitchen, 182 S. W. (2d) 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See also note 51, infra.




herself by such a contract, the statute5 ordinarily makes her hus-
band liable too. Another possible situation is the wife's binding
the husband without being bound herself. A third possibility is
her being liable without his being bound. The test is the intention
of the wife and the third party creditor; i.e., on whose credit
did he rely.6
What are necessaries? This term is held to include property
reasonably suited to her station in life, both economic and social.!
Illustrations are: the purchase of a piano and furniture, an auto-
mobile for the use of the family, clothes, food, physicians' serv-
ices, dental work,' and the courts have even hinted that the erection
or purchase of a home by the wife may be classified as a neces-
sary.9 The Texas courts also hold that the cost of services of an
attorney to represent the wife in a divorce suit is a necessary.'
CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF, AND IN THE MANAGEMENT
OF, THE WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY
It would be well to distinguish between the wife's power to
contract in connection with the management of her separate
property and her power to contract for the benefit of such property.
A contract which is one of these two types will almost invariably
be the other type also. Perhaps the only clear example of a man-
agement contract which is not for the property's benefit (i.e., in-
tended as a benefit, though it may eventuate otherwise) is the
5 Id. art. 4613.
6 See note 39. infra. As to what property may be subjected to the creditor in these
various situations, see comment in this issue, The Liability of Marital Property for the
Contracts and Torts of Husband and Wife.
7 Tax. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon 1925) art. 4624; Walling v. Honnig, 73 Tex.
580, 11 S. W. 547 (1889); Milburn v. Walker, 11 Tex. 329 (1854); McKee v. Popular
Dry Goods Co., 240 S. W. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Fallin v. Williamson Cadillac
Co., 40 S. W. (2d) 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; 23 TEX. Jun. 200 (1932) ; note 18 Tax.
L. Rav. 91 (1940).
823 Tax. Jun. 200, 201 (1932), and cases therein cited.
9 Bexar Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Heady, 50 S. W. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899);
Howell v. McMurray Lumber Co., 132 S. W. 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
10 McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S. W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Yager v. Bradley,
226 S. W. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Dodd v. Hein, 26 Civ. App. 164, 62 S. W. 811
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
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undoubtedly rare situation of a contract contemplating a lowering
of the property's value to satisfy a whim of the owner; perhaps,
for example, a contract to change a productive farm into a bird
sanctuary. While the two types of contracts arose at different
times and under different statutes, one by express provision, the
other by implication, the point of principal importance today is,
that both are valid. That is, the courts allow the wife to make valid
contracts in relation to her separate property, both in its manage-
ment and for its benefit.
By statute, the wife is given full management of her separate
property. However, there is today no express statute providing
that the wife may contract and incur debts for the benefit of her
separate estate. In the Act of 1848, the wife was given the right
to contract for the benefit of her separate estate. This provision
continued in effect until 1913, at which time it was omitted;
and it was also omitted in the revision of 1925, except for a pro-
vision in a different portion of the statutes12 that the husband
must be joined when the wife is sued for expenses which she has
incurred for the benefit of her separate property. This joinder
statute probably preserves the wife's power to make such con-
tracts. A recent Supreme Court case1" includes such contracts in
an enumeration of the wife's authorized contracts.
The Supreme Court earlier, in Levin v. Jeffers," held that
when the 1913 statute gave the wife the sole management of her
separate property, it by necessary implication clothed her with the
power to make contracts incidental to such management. Still
earlier, Gohlinan, Lester and Co. v. Whittle"5 had applied the
same reasoning to her contracts incidental to disposition of her
separate property. These decisions recognize that since a married
woman has the sole control and disposition (except for the hus-
11 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 4614.
12 Id. art. 1984.
1 Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S. W. (2d) 733 (1943).
14 Levin v. Jeffers. 122 Tex. 83. 52 S. W. (2d) 81 (1932).
15 Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 584, 273 S. W. 808 (1925).
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band's joinder as to land, stocks and bonds) of her separate prop-
erty, she may contract very broadly in its behalf, much as if she
were a feme sole. But the contract must concern her separate
estate, and not the community even though that stood in her name.'
The courts have held that the following contracts are valid; the
fee of an architect; brokerage commissions; the cost of fuel oil
for her drilling rig; insurance premiums on her automobile; the
fees of an attorney to protect her rights; and the price of supplies
furnished her to make a crop on her separate land.17
THE WIFE'S CONTRACTS TO CONVEY OR ENCUMBER HER
SEPARATE PROPERTY AND HER WARRANTIES
Of course the wife can convey her separate property without
restriction except that as to land, her husband must join and she
must separately acknowledge, 8 and as to stocks and bonds her
husband must join. 9 Since a mortgage is a species of conveyance,
the above rules would be expected to apply thereto; and they do
expressly apply to encumbrance of the wife's land, and probably
also to pledge of her stocks and bonds accompanied by indorse-
ment.2 She can convey or encumber other choses in action, and
all chattels, without restriction of any sort.2
May the wife validly contract to convey, or to encumber, her
separate property? Such contracts would certainly seem to be
valid under the preceding major topic, as incidental to her power
to manage and dispose of her separate property. They are held
to be valid except when land is involved; then a contract which
on other principles would be valid, becomes in effect voidable.
The reason is, such contract must be consummated by a deed or
deed of trust, which must contain the wife's separate acknowledge-
1023 TEX. JuR. 205 (1932) : Strickland v. Pilgrim. 300 S. W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) ; note 7 TEX. L. REv. 615 (1929)
17 23 TEX. JuR. 204 (1932) and cases cited therein.
18 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's .1925) arts. 4614. 1299.
19 Id.: art. 4614.
20 Ibid. The statute speaks of a "transfer of her stocks and bonds.
21 Donaldson v. Clark, 163 S. W. (2d) 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
1950].
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ment; and the last phrase thereof states that she does not wish to
retract the transaction. Therefore, it is held that her deed or deed
of trust is ineffective until the full completion of such separate
acknowldgment, and accordingly her preceding contract to con-
vey or to mortgage is unenforceable and voidable.
Levin v. Jeffers states:
"Any contract the validity of which is dependent upon her subse-
quently executing an instrument requiring her privy acknowledg-
ment, she may repudiate at any time while the same remains execu-
tory. The reason she may do so is that the statutory acknowledgment,
essential to give such contract validity, grants her the privilege of
retracting it up to the time of performance. 22
Though such contract contains her separate acknowledgment,
it is still voidable. 3 Somewhat the same rasoning makes voidable
her contract to join in conveying the homestead where it is the
husband's separate property or community property.24
Does the preceding paragraph apply to the wife's stocks and
bonds? No case has been found on the point. Her separate
acknowledgment is not required here, but the husband's signature
is necessary.25 In Texas Jurisprudence, it is stated:
"'The joint signature of the husband and wife shall be necessary
to transfer of stocks and bonds belonging to her or of which she may
be given control by this law.' This effectively prevents the wife from
making any contracts for the transfer of stocks and bonds belonging
to her, as it prescribes the exclusive way for effecting such trans-
fer. 26
As to other choses in action and as to all chattels, the wife's
contracts to convey or to encumber are apparently valid.27
22122 Tex. at 87; 52 S. W. (2d) at 83.
23 Blakely v. Kanaman, 107 Tex. 551. 175 S. W. 674 (1915).
24 TEx. REv. CEv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 1300; 23 TEx. JuR. 255 (1932).
25 See note 21. supra.
2623 TEx. Juit. 228 (1932).
27 Gohlman v. Whittle. 114 Tex. 584, 273 S. W. 808 (1925); Becker v. Goodman-
Kantz Furniture Co., 13 S. W. (2d) 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Merritt, 16 S. W. (2d) 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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If the wife properly executes a deed to her separate land con-
taining an express warranty, is she liable thereon? Such a war-
ranty has been held not to be a necessary incident to such convey-
ance, and therefore (not being otherwise authorized by statute)
not binding upon her,2" and the rule has even been stated to
preclude the implied warranties which would otherwise arise,
except when a quitclaim is executed, under Article 1297.29 Apart
from the cases, express warranties and probably also implied
ones would appear to be contracts incidental to the wife's dispo-
sition of her separate property, and therefore valid under the
preceding major topic. As a practical matter, her sale of separate
lands is greatly hampered and often prevented, if she cannot bind
herself by warranty. The power given to her by Article 461780 to
convey her separate land without the husband's joinder where
he is insane or has abandoned her, seems similarly hampered if
her warranties are held to be voidable. Thus on principle and
from practical effect, there is a strong argument that the wife's
warranties ought to be held valid. No cases have been found
dealing with the wife's warranty when selling her personal
property.
THE WIFE'S SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS
Part of this topic is discussed below under "The Effect of the
Husband's Joinder As Binding His Wife". A fuller coverage will
be found in a comment in the preceding issue of The Southwestern
Law Journal."
WIFE'S CONTRACTS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
This topic is also covered by a comment in the preceding issue
of this Journal.2
28 Panhandle Construction Co. v. Lindsey, 123 Tex. 613; 72 S. W. (2d) 1068 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1934) ; Wodkin v. Watson. 86 Tex. 194. 24 S. W. 385 (1893).
29 T. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 1297.
80 Id. art. 4617.
51 Comment, The Wile and Her Property as Surety, 4 SOUTHWESTERN L J. 107
(1950).
82 Comment. The File's Emergency Powers, Id. at 112.
1950]
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THE WIFE'S CONTRACTS AS TO "SPECIAL
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Article 4616"3 exempts four items of community property from
liability for the husband's debts and torts; viz., rents from the
wife's separate land, interest on her notes and bonds, dividends
on her stock, and her earnings. Thus for purposes of liability,
a new class of community property was created, which has been
called "special community property." In Hawkins v. Britton State
Bank,3" the Supreme Court held that such rents are controlled by
the wife, because otherwise her control of her separate land is
vitiated and it is likely that this same reasoning will lead to hold-
ings that she controls also her interest and dividends. Thus three
of the four items enumerated above are probably under the wife's
control, and the Hawkins case possibly indicates that she also has
the disposition thereof.8"
Since the wife's control and disposition of her separate property
result in an implied power to contract with reference thereto, it
is reasonably certain that her similar control of one and probably
three of the above items of community property will give her a
similar implied power to contract. No cases have yet appeared on
this point.
LIABILITY OF THE HUSBAND ON HIS WIFE'S CONTRACTS
By statute the husband is liable for necessaries furnished his
wife;36 however the courts have held that the wife only is liable
if the tradesman chooses not to rely on the husband's credit.87
33 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4616.
34 Hawkins v. Britton State Bank. 122 Tex, 69. 52 S. W. (2d) 243 (1932) ; see also
Goblman. Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 584, 273 S. W. 808 (1925); Bobbitt. Is
There More Than One Class of Community Property in Texas?, 4 TaX. L. RaV. 154
(1926).
85 See comment, 4 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 88 (1950).
86 Refer also to the beginning of this article under the heading "The Wife's Con-
tracts for Necessaries," notes 5-10. supra.
'7 Crosby v. A. Harris & Co.. 235 S. W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Colonna v.
Kruger, 246 S. W. 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; but cf. McKee v. Popular Dry Goods
Co., 240 S. W. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; 23 TFx. Jun. 208 (1932); 27 A. L. R. 554:
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Such liability is not on the theory of agency, because true agency
is always consensual, and the husband might dissent; it is a lia-
bility imposed by law, irrespective of consent.3"
Judge Speer believes the husband is liable on the wife's con-
tracts for the benefit of her separate property.89 One case, while
expressly not so holding, indicates there is a possibility of such
liability.4" The basis for this view is the language of Articles 1984
and 1985."'
"The husband and wife shall be jointly sued for all debts contract-
ed by the wife for necessaries furnished herself or children, and for
expenses which may have been incurred by the wife for the benfit of
her separate property, [and]
"The husband shall be joined in suits for separate debts and de-
mands against the wife, but no personal judgment shall be rendered
against the husband."
Both statutes provide that the husband must be joined in suits
against the wife. The latter statute provides that no judgment shall
be rendered against him. The former says nothing whatever about
judgments against the husband, but it apparently contemplates
that such judgments will be rendered. (If not, the former statute
would be totally redundant, for it would be totally comprehended
within the wider generality of the latter statute. More important,
the former statute deals with the wife's contracts for necessaries,
and several other statutes imply that the husband's property, and
therefore he, is liable therefor.)"
"The rule appears to be well settled, both at common law and under modem statutes,
that if the credit for necessaries furnished to the wife is given exclusively to her, the
husband is not ordinarily liable therefor."
's TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4613, 4621, 4623, 1948. Note, 1 Tr,.
L REv. 109 (1923).
'p23 TEx. Jus. 209 (1932) citing, Williams v. Doan, 209 S. W. 761 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919). Compare, Cauble v. Beaver Electra Ref. Co., 243 S. W. 762 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922). See discussion in SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RICHTS IN TEXAs, 245-246;
(3rd Ed. 1929).
40 Farm & Home Savings' & Loan Ass'n. of Missouri v. Abernathy, 129 Tex. 379,
102 S. W. (2d) 410. (Tex. Comm. of App. 1937).
4' TFx. Rv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 1984. 1985.
42 Id. art. 4613. 4621. 4623.
1950] .
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Thus the argument is, since the former statute's reference to
the wife's contracts for the benefit of her separate property exactly
parallels its reference to her contracts for necessaries, it must be
the legislative intention to hold the husband liable on both such
types of contracts.
Whether the husband is bound on those rare contracts of hers
which are not for the benefit of her separate property, but which
are in furtherance of her management of such property, has never
been decided. He is probably not liable.43
THE EFFECT OF THE HUSBAND'S JOINDER AS
BINDING His WIFE
There is a widespread notion that if the husband does not join
with his wife, the contract will not be binding on her; and fre-
quently there is the converse notion that if he does join, the con-
tract will always bind her. Judge Speer dispels these erroneous
beliefs as follows:
"But it is proper to say here that with her ability to contract, his
[the husband's] assent has nothing to do. If she be authorized to con-
tract in a particular instance, his assent is not required, and if she be
not, his assent cannot confer the right upon her even if he joins with
her in the undertaking. He would then bind himself only and not
her."44
Thus it is noticed that if the husband joins in a contract with his
wife, he is a party thereto and will be bound (unless he merely
joins pro forma); but she will be bound only if it is one of the
types of contracts (discussed supra), which she is authorized by
law to make. The only exception to the foregoing, where the hus-
band's joinder is required to bind the wife, is her suretyship
contract. Article 4623" provides: "The wife shall never be the
joint maker of a note, or a surety, on any bond or obligation of
another without the joinder of her husband with her in making
43 23 TEx. JUR. 209 (1932).
44 SpMa, op. cit. supra, note 39 at 231.
4 TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's 1925). art. 4623.
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such contract." By implication she is thus empowered to bind
herself by such a contract of suretyship if, and only if, her hus-
band signs with her. The requirements of his joinder prevent her
becoming a personal surety for him," because he would then in
a sense be a surety for himself. Whether the husband's joinder
pro forma is sufficient to bind the wife, seems not to have been
decided.
RESCISSION OF THE WIFE'S CONTRACTS
Generally the assent of all parties to a valid contract is essen-
tial to its rescission. However, a contract may be rescinded
without the consent of the other party where it is voidable; e.g.,
for mental incapacity, intoxication, fraud, mistake, duress or un-
due influence.' A wife, like any one else, may avoid her con-
tracts if any of the foregoing grounds exist."
It is well settled in Texas that a wife's contract which does not
come within the purposes authorized by statute is not void but
merely voidable."9 Thus if the wife is a party to a voidable con-
tract, she may elect not to rescind, in which event the contract is in
effect valid. She may elect to rescind, by formal or informal
methods, or she may in effect do the same thing by pleading her
coverture when sued thereon." However, she must specially plead
the defense of coverture where it does not affirmatively appear
or she will be regarded as having waived it." Since the wife's
contract is voidable only by her, the other party is bound unless
46 Red River Nat. Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S. W. 923 (1918) ; Reynolds
Mortgage Co. v. Smith, 280 S. W. 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Butler Bros. v. Baker,
271 S. W. 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Bird v. Bird, 212 S. W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
47 10 TEn. JuR. 383 (1930) and cases, and TEx. Jut. sections there cited.
48 23 TEr. JuR. 238 (1932) ; citing, Jay v. Robinson, 39 S. W. (2d) 943 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) ; Wickman v. Aldridge, 21 S. W. (2d) 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Spain,
op. cit. supra, note 39 at 270.
4'Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 84 S. W. (2d) 993 (1935) ; Harris v. Ware, 93
S. W. (2d) 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Note 17 TEx. L Rzv. 217 (1939).
50 Pitt v. Elser, 87 Tex. 347, 28 S. W. 518 (1894) ; 23 TE.. Jtn. 237 (1932). SPFM,
op. cit. supra, note 39 at 270.
51 Phelps v. Brachitt, 24 Tex. 236 (1859) ; Gamel v. City Natl. Bank, - Tex.
__., 258 S. W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924); Klien v. Richter, 119 S. W. (2d)
100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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